Structure, agency and local climate governance: how do individual actors exploit local contexts to shape policymaking in smaller cities and towns? (2024)

2.1. How local structural conditions shape climate governance

In a recent article, Haupt et al. (Citation2023) identified a set of socio-economic, economic and political conditions that have a considerable impact on a city’s climate transformation pathway. Building on previous studies, they stress that an above-average educated and below-average aged population can contribute towards more progressive local climate policy (Bedsworth & Hanak, Citation2013; Krause, Citation2011; Zahran et al., Citation2008). These demographic factors often result in a stronger local civil society (Haupt et al., Citation2023; Homsy, Citation2018; Krause, Citation2011), in which environmental and climate groups are particularly active. Such conditions are also linked with more ambitious local climate policy (Kern et al., Citation2021b; Zahran et al., Citation2008), partly because younger people tend to be more concerned about climate and environmental issues (Hickman et al., Citation2021). For example, a study of 21 mid-sized German cities demonstrated that local Fridays for Future (FfF) groups are much larger, more powerful and far more demanding in cities with an above-average educated and below-average aged population (Haupt et al., Citation2023). Indeed, physical proximity to universities and public and non-public research institutions can also have advantages for local climate governance, because these organisations can develop knowledge (e.g., through applied projects, student projects or dissertations) and collaborate with local municipal administrations (Bery & Haddad, Citation2023; Eckersley, Citation2018; Keeler et al., Citation2019). In turn, they may also recruit future climate policy specialists directly from the university after graduation (Haupt et al., Citation2023; Kern et al., Citation2021b).

Economic factors are also important for local climate governance. For example, cities with above-average salaries and high employment rates tend to perform better in climate policy (Bedsworth & Hanak, Citation2013; Krause, Citation2011; Zahran et al., Citation2008). The same applies to cities with a high share of people employed in the service sector, especially those dominated by jobs that require highly qualified specialists (Kern et al., Citation2021b). Likewise, because larger industrial companies are either totally absent or play a very minor role in these cities, local politicians are less likely to face high political costs or risk major conflicts if they seek to pursue more active climate policies (Kalt, Citation2021).

Furthermore, these socio-economic factors contribute to political conditions that are favourable for climate governance. First, because younger and well-educated citizens are more likely to vote for green or alternative parties, or parties and candidates that give higher priority to environmental and climate matters (Kern et al., Citation2021b). Second, because right-wing populist parties, which often adopt climate-sceptic positions (Huber, Citation2020; Huber et al., Citation2020; Kulin et al., Citation2021), are usually weak or not represented in these local councils (Haupt et al., Citation2023). Third, because the presence of strong environmental and climate groups that push for more climate action puts stronger pressure on local politics to take action (Grzymala-Kazlowska & O’Farrell, Citation2023; Haupt et al., Citation2023). And finally fourth, because economically secure and wealthy cities have greater financial capacities to pursue climate action strategically, rather than just sporadically or incrementally (Kern et al., Citation2021a). Overall, cities in which these structural conditions are present are more likely to adopt resolutions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or to become climate-neutral (Ravetz et al., Citation2021), to declare a climate emergency (Haupt et al., Citation2023) and to develop climate mitigation or adaptation plans (Otto et al., Citation2021). They are also more likely to employ additional staff to coordinate and implement climate policies, and to institutionalise and embed mitigation and adaptation within the municipal administration (Göpfert et al., Citation2019; Otto et al., Citation2021).

2.2. How key individual actors shape local climate governance

However, despite the importance of the structural conditions described above, actors that operate within urban political institutions are still able to exercise agency in influencing local policies. This will almost certainly vary from city to city, and be shaped by the resources these individuals possess and the degree of autonomy they can exercise, but governance arrangements and policy approaches are not predetermined by the multilevel and socio-economic context. As such, individual actors within a local administration can be key for climate action (Corcaci & Kemmerzell, Citation2023; Fenton, Citation2016; Hörter et al., Citation2018; Kern et al., Citation2021a; Olson et al., Citation2021; Vedeld & Hofstad, Citation2022). Reflecting the pivotal role that they often play in policymaking, Haupt and Kern (Citation2022, p. 4) define such individuals as ‘local actors that determine or influence a city’s climate policy pathway’. Although agency in a climate change context can also be exerted by non-state actors (Nasiritousi et al., Citation2016), our study focuses on the role of key individuals working within local government. Hörter et al. (Citation2018) characterised key actors in local climate governance as having a sense of high pressure to act, high personal reputation and strong networking skills. They provide information, but also initiate, accelerate and support change processes in local administrations. Focusing on the German context, Hörter et al. distinguish four types of key actors, which are primarily classified according to their role in policymaking: First, information brokers, for example, scientists that do not have any direct decision-making competencies since they do not hold positions in the municipal administration. Despite this, they can still initiate a local process through their expertise– ideally also in the form of detailed knowledge about the respective city. Second, supporters, for example, climate managers or municipal staff in environmental departments or related units, who are in charge of climate action. They are hierarchically located at the administrative level and are typically the ones ‘who bring together and hold the threads in the network’ (Hörter et al., Citation2018, p. 19). Third and fourth, we have key actors at the management level (initiators and accelerators) that kick off or speed up processes and set change in motion. Initiators and accelerators can be, for example, mayors, heads of environmental departments or managing directors of public utilities.

Supporters, initiators and accelerators, as we understand them, show a high degree of similarity with policy entrepreneurs. The political science literature characterises policy entrepreneurs as individuals who invest considerable time and effort in trying to put and keep an issue on the political agenda and achieve their policy goal(s), thereby influencing agenda setting, policy formulation and sometimes triggering policy change (Cairney, Citation2018; Corcaci & Kemmerzell, Citation2023; Kingdon, Citation1984). Cairney (Citation2018, p. 199) explains that this often ‘requires framing a problem, having a solution ready, and exploiting the motive and opportunity of policymakers to select it’. Indeed, there is a growing literature on the importance of problem-framing in policymaking (Knaggård, Citation2015; Reardon, Citation2018; Wright et al., Citation2023), albeit one that has only recently begun to examine how this plays out in terms of local climate governance (Zanocco & Sousa-Silva, Citation2023).

Previous research highlights how such key actors can positively influence local climate governance. For example, they can use their knowledge of the policymaking process to establish and maintain contacts with key local politicians (e.g., city mayors or deputy mayors) to bring or keep climate action or wider sustainability matters on top of the municipal agenda (Corcaci & Kemmerzell, Citation2023; Fenton, Citation2016; Haupt & Kern, Citation2022; Kern et al., Citation2021a). Given that studies have shown how mayoral support is essential for successful climate policymaking (Growe & Freytag, Citation2019; Kern et al., Citation2021a; Sancino et al., Citation2022), we can see how these attributes can play a crucial role in pushing forward a progressive approach. Studies have highlighted how policy entrepreneurs frame their preferred policies as solutions to problems that emerge, sometimes after sudden shocks or events that grab the attention of key local politicians (Cairney, Citation2018; Eckersley & Lakoma, Citation2022). One example here might be a heatwave or severe pluvial flooding event, which could result in a city being more likely to approve climate adaptation measures (Kern et al., Citation2021a; Zanocco & Sousa-Silva, Citation2023). Indeed, previous research has shown that local vulnerabilities to climate change can raise awareness among the population and policymakers and eventually lead to the implementation of adaptation policies (Kern et al., Citation2023; Otto et al., Citation2021). Moreover, successful key actors are also aware of and connected with a diverse set of additional local stakeholders from different sectors, such as the municipal administration, civil society or economy (Fenton, Citation2016; Haupt & Kern, Citation2022; Kern et al., Citation2021b; Moloney & Fünfgeld, Citation2015). Their networks are not limited to their municipality but can also include connections with colleagues from their regions, countries or even from foreign countries (Fenton & Paschek, Citation2018; Hörter et al., Citation2018; Lintz, Citation2016). The latter particularly applies to municipalities active in municipal climate networks (Busch et al., Citation2018; Sancino et al., Citation2022). In addition, key actors often manage to set up collaborations with scientists (information brokers) at the project level. These collaborations can help when generating the necessary knowledge to inform local heat maps or heavy rain hazard maps (Haupt & Kern, Citation2022; Kern et al., Citation2021b). Finally, an important task of key actors, particularly in municipalities that are experiencing resource constraints, centres around the acquisition of third party funds. External funding can contribute towards the recruitment of temporary municipal staff, the development of mitigation, adaptation and mobility plans or the implementation of policies (Fenton & Paschek, Citation2018; Kern et al., Citation2023; Otto et al., Citation2021). Nevertheless, skills and efforts are not the only factors that contribute to the successful of these local actors. Indeed, as emphasised by Kingdon (Citation1984), ideal policy entrepreneurs are normally just the right people, in the right place, at the right time. This highlights that some success factors are simply outside the sphere of their influence. In other words, they also need to be lucky.

2.3. How structural conditions and agency relate to each other

We posit that both structure (local socio-economic, demographic and political factors) and agency (the strategies and behaviour of individual actors within municipalities) are influential in shaping climate policy. Where local conditions are ripe for action, and where relevant individuals possess the requisite resources to push policy forward, they are most likely to be successful. For example, we might expect municipal climate managers to find it easier to progress their agenda if they have specific knowledge or expertise related to possible policy options, and/or access to wider networks and funding opportunities. Moreover, following Cairney (Citation2018), Reardon (Citation2018) and Eckersley and Lakoma (Citation2022), we suggest that agency may be more important in smaller organisations, since these contexts allow individuals to exercise more influence in policymaking processes.

However, it can often be difficult to disentangle structure from agency in policymaking contexts. In the specific area of local climate policy, for example, a climate manager’s position within the municipality shapes whether and how they might be able to push forward a particular initiative. Other factors, such as the existence of support networks or funding opportunities, will also affect how much they can influence decisions (Haupt & Kern, Citation2022). If we understand agency as having the resources, capacity and ability to pursue an autonomous path (Ortner, Citation2006), the extent to which an individual can exercise this power is clearly shaped by the structural context within which they operate. To complicate matters further, even if individuals possess a great deal of power and resources, they may choose not to exercise their agency and remain passive.

Giddens (Citation1979) sought to overcome this dichotomy with his concept of ‘structuration’ as a way of balancing both structure and agency in social relations. Giddens stressed that many structural conditions influence – often subconsciously – how actors operate, but nonetheless left room for individuals to choose to act and exploit certain conditions in order to further their own particular desires. As we discussed earlier with regard to policy entrepreneurs, a key part of this depends on whether key actors know how they might be able to exploit social situations to pursue their own interests. The extent to which an individual can exercise agency might therefore depend as much on knowing which levers to pull as being in a position to pull them. Knowledge of the specific context, alongside an individual’s position in the social hierarchy, financial resources, networks and other skills and resources, play a crucial role in shaping whether, how, and the extent to which people can exercise agency. In the specific case of local climate policy, for example, we can see how municipal managers might seek to push for a greater focus on adaptation following a severe weather event, or incorporate mitigation initiatives into other policy areas that the municipality considers a higher priority (e.g., economic development). Given that policymaking structures vary considerably according to local contexts, we might expect climate managers to deploy very different strategies in their own particular situations, reflecting their respective knowledge of local policymaking arrangements. In this way, we can see how the policy entrepreneurs described above might exercise varying degrees of agency and adopt very different strategies, depending on both the local context and their own skills and awareness.

4.1. Socio-economic factors

We found that economic actors were often quite influential in climate policymaking, particularly in those towns with less favourable socio-economic conditions, such as those with high unemployment, a high dependency on fiscal transfers, and low average incomes (see also ). Such municipalities were more constrained financially, and tended to prioritise economic development over climate concerns as a result. For example, one of our towns is seeking to develop new infrastructure for offshore hydrogen projects. The climate manager sees his role as highlighting the negative environmental effects of this project in conversations with different administrative and political actors who extol its potential economic benefits (interview 3). However, private firms in other more disadvantaged areas wanted the municipality to be more active. For instance, although local socio-economic conditions in Neubrandenburg are not conducive to progressive climate policy, companies have threatened to leave the town if it does not increase the share of renewable energy (interview 15). In Emden, a large energy supplier approached the council many years ago to initiate the production of wind energy, which now has a longstanding tradition in the town (interview 3).

Our fieldwork confirmed that a town’s socio-economic situation also affected the financial and human resources available to the municipality. Towns with higher employment and above-average incomes were less dependent on direct grant funding than their poorer counterparts, and in a better position to fund additional staff who focus solely on mitigation and adaptation. They were also able to prioritise projects and then fund them out of the municipal budget, whereas climate managers in poorer towns often had to search for funding programmes, convince other departments to support their bids, and then design their projects accordingly.

The climate managers we interviewed mentioned how they found other creative ways to fund their projects. Alongside public funding programmes, they garnered support through personal networks, such as by collaborating with universities. For example, two of our towns with unfavourable socio-economic conditions used university student projects to inform their mitigation and adaptation efforts. Administrators in Gera built on a bachelor thesis that sets out the possibility of introducing a ‘climate-check’ to force the town council to set out the climate change implications of its decisions (interviews 7, 8). In Neubrandenburg, the climate manager used his personal ties to universities in England and Switzerland to get doctoral students to work on climate-related models for the town (interview 15).

4.2. Demographic factors

Our interviewees confirmed the importance of demographics such as average age and the share of students in their respective towns. For example, climate managers in towns with a larger share of older people, such as Gera and Neubrandenburg, found it more difficult to win support for their mitigation efforts. Several interviewees also mentioned that older members of staff who had worked in the local administration for decades were more likely to prevent action, whereas a generational change in staff helped to bring policies forward. Notably, however, some municipalities with older populations found it easier to win public support by emphasising adaptation, as impacts such as heat stress are more tangible and affect older people disproportionately. For instance, Gera’s head of the environmental department reduced the entrance fee for the local wildlife park on very hot days, thereby giving residents greater access to shading and greenery (interviews 7, 8). This example also illustrates how policymakers in towns with little civic support for climate action sought to push for policies which create little controversy. Similarly, citizens exploited the tangible effects of climate change to gain public support and increase pressure on political actors. In Görlitz, an organised civic group highlighted that the temperature on a central square in summer exceeded 50°C (interview 10). Through media reports, they successfully mobilised political and public support across parties for the redesign of that square, including measures to reduce car traffic.

Our interviewees also mentioned higher education and research institutions as a source of support to the municipality’s climate efforts, even in those towns that did not have large student populations. By way of contrast, climate managers in Gera, Neumünster and Stralsund explicitly contrasted their municipalities with university towns nearby, to emphasise how their lack of students made it more difficult for them to push policy forward (interviews 7, 16, 17). Towns with universities were more likely to have active FfF groups comprising local students and pupils, which then increase pressure on municipal governments to combat climate change. These groups have been successful in Konstanz, Kempten, Worms, Elmshorn and Emden, the municipalities in our sample that have the largest shares of students (interviews 3–5, 11, 13, 18). In other towns, FfF groups are much less active than they used to be at the movement’s peak in 2019, as school pupils have moved away to attend university elsewhere, and the local groups have struggled to sustain an active core of members.

Reflecting how our selection of demographic and socio-economic factors overlap, it is notable that the two towns with the most advantageous local conditions for climate policy, Kempten and Konstanz, also benefit from very active civil society and third sector organisations. Furthermore, unlike our other case studies, civil society groups in these two towns are well connected to local administrative actors through different formats of exchange and collaboration (see also section 4.3).

4.3. Political factors

As we suspected, the political conditions for more active climate policy were more favourable in those towns where green and alternative parties won larger shares of the vote. For example, climate managers confirmed that recent increases in vote shares for the Green Party in Kempten and Konstanz have opened up new possibilities and helped them to push efforts in climate mitigation (interviews 11, 13). In contrast, political conditions were less favourable in municipalities where the right-wing AfD were particularly strong; climate managers in these towns faced much greater opposition (interviews 7, 17). We found it difficult to evaluate the influence of other political parties, because our interviewees suggested that the direction and level of support they received from the Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – SPD) or the more conservative Christian Democrats (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands – CDU/Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern – CSU) varied a lot across our case studies. For example, conservative mayors started to initiate and push climate policies in Kempten and Stralsund 15 years ago (interviews 11, 17). While the CDU/CSU now tend to oppose more progressive climate policies in Kempten, they are more supportive in other towns such as Emden (interviews 2, 11). Smaller, local parties also tend to play a bigger role in towns compared with larger cities.

We found that political majorities within the council shaped both institutional structures and dominant narratives around climate change. In terms of institutional structures, for example, Kempten established a climate council and a working group on climate adaptation, in which members of civil society, politicians and administrative staff work together (interview 11). This collaboration between administration and civil society was more informal elsewhere: in Konstanz, FfF and the local climate manager worked together on the municipality’s climate emergency declaration (interviews 13, 14). In other towns, ties between local administration and civic actors were either very loose (e.g., Emden) or barely existed at all (e.g., Neubrandenburg, Stralsund) (interviews 2, 3, 16, 17).

Regarding the narratives in which climate policies are embedded, we found that climate managers in towns with less favourable political contexts sought to frame adaptation policies under the umbrella of urban greening, and mitigation policies in terms of economic development. Avoiding the term ‘climate change’ when proposing adaptation measures proved to be a successful strategy in those towns with strong climate-sceptic parties. For example, a climate manager from Stralsund stressed that AfD politicians were not opposed to extending green spaces (interview 17). Climate managers in towns with moderately unfavourable political conditions, such as Emden, sought synergies between economic development and climate targets (interview 2). At the same time, this strategy of highlighting the economic benefits of new infrastructure for renewable energies or aiming to make new development projects more sustainable in terms of design standards downplayed the potentially negative environmental impacts, such as increased land take. Elsewhere, other municipalities used concepts of sustainability or carbon neutrality explicitly to promote the town, but tailored to different local contexts. For example, the climate manager in Konstanz (a town with favourable political conditions and an active civil society) emphasised how urban transformation would help the municipality to adhere to climate targets (interview 13). Arnsberg, a place with moderately unfavourable political factors and a less active civil society, has reformed its institutional structures but the town only shows slow progress regarding actual policies (interview 1). The situation in Görlitz, which has a very unfavourable political context for climate action, is very different again: in 2019 the CDU mayor incorporated climate neutrality into his election campaign to win over Green party voters in a two-way run-off with the AfD (interviews 9, 10). While Görlitz’s website still states that climate neutrality is a municipal objective, it has not been agreed upon in the council and there are no policies in place to underpin it.

4.4. Climate risk factors

The impacts of climate change are becoming real for residents in all our case study towns. Frequent heavy rainfall events on the one hand, and very dry, hot summers on the other, are increasingly affecting urban infrastructure and the well-being of residents. Compared with other German towns, Worms is one of the places most affected by both heat waves and heavy rain (interviews 18, 19). In Arnsberg, one person died due to a heavy rainfall event in 2007, and Gera experienced a ‘once in a century’ flooding event five years later (interviews 1, 7, 8). Located on the North Sea coast, Emden is affected by rising sea levels and heavily reliant on dyke protection (interviews 2, 3). Our interviewees in Elmshorn stressed that residents still remember a flood that swept away large parts of the town in the 1960s (interviews 4, 5). Summer heatwaves have caused water shortage in Kempten and Arnsberg, and residents in Konstanz have watched Lake Constance almost drying up (interviews 1, 11, 13). In towns located near to large forests such as Arnsberg and Gera, dying trees have made the impacts of climate change more visible (interviews 1, 7, 8).

Yet, these impacts of climate change only translated into climate action in our towns where climate managers decided to draw on them to gain political and civic support for their action. In addition, we found that these individuals were more likely to highlight the effects of climate change when pushing for action on adaptation than for mitigation. This was particularly the case in towns with older populations, whose citizens are more vulnerable to extreme heat but perhaps still reluctant to support mitigation efforts, for example, Gera, Neubrandenburg, Görlitz, and Stralsund (interviews 7–10, 17). While this has not led to particularly substantial adaption policies in these four towns, the situation is quite different in Worms and Elmshorn. Both places are shaped by moderately favourable socio-economic, demographic and political factors, which would lead us to expect slightly above-average levels of climate action. This was the case in terms of mitigation, but both towns are actually forerunners in adaptation. Elmshorn has participated in several research projects to develop adaptation plans with a focus on heavy rainfall events (interviews 5, 6). Alongside developing separate plans to address heavy rainfall and heat, the climate manager in Worms set up a network with climate managers from other towns to exchange knowledge and experiences in the area of adaptation (interview 18).

In other case study towns, climate managers have set different priorities. For example, in Konstanz– a town with overwhelming civic and political support for climate action (at least rhetorically)– the climate manager explicitly mentioned that he prioritises climate mitigation over adaptation. Whilst he agreed that adaptation was important, he did not want resources to be diverted away from mitigation and was concerned that shifting the focus too much could suggest that mitigation efforts have failed (interview 13).

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